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Abstract
There are many issues associated with the Eurozone accession
of Poland. The goal of this paper is to analyse one, but very im-
portant aspect, namely - the macroeconomic impact of the loss of
autonomous monetary policy. In order to answer this question, we
build a two country DSGE model with sticky prices. We begin by
evaluating the performance of our model. Next, we investigate how
joining the Eurozone will aﬀect the business cycle behaviour of the
main macroeconomic variables in Poland. We ﬁnd that the Euro
adoption will have a noticeable impact on the Polish economic ﬂuc-
tuations. In particular, the volatility of domestic output increases
and the volatility of inﬂation decreases. Also, in order to quantify
the eﬀect of the Euro adoption, we compute the welfare eﬀect of this
monetary policy change. Our ﬁndings suggest that the welfare cost
is not large.
JEL: E52, E58, F41, F33.
Keywords: Monetary policy, EMU accession countries, Euro.6
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1I n troduction
With the accession to the European Union in 2004, Poland, as well as the
other New Member States, agreed to adopt the Euro as the national currency
and become a member of the Euro area. However, the accession to the Euro
area implies important changes in both the conduct of macroeconomic policy
and the behaviour of the accessing economy. The most important of these
are:
• ﬁxing of the exchange rate against the other participants of the Euro
area,
• resignation from the autonomous monetary policy in favour of the
common monetary policy conducted by the ECB.
These changes bring both beneﬁts and costs for the accessing country.
Toalarge extent, the existing literature focused on welfare beneﬁts as-
sociated with the membership in the monetary union. Rose (2000) and
Frankel and Rose (2002) argued that the accession to the monetary union
boosts trade, creating welfare gains. But their estimate of the magnitude of
this eﬀect met some criticism - see e.g. Faruqee (2004). In case of the Polish
economy, the important contribution of Daras and Hagemejer (2008) shows
the beneﬁts of the Euro adoption, taking into account the trade creation
eﬀect and a decline of the long-term real interest rate through elimination of
the risk premium. Their results were calculated using dynamic Computable
General Equilibrium (CGE) framework.
Our contribution to the discussion on the consequences of the Euro adop-
tion concentrates on the costs associated with abandoning autonomous mon-
etary policy. So, after the accession to the Euro area, monetary policy will
be conducted by the European Central Bank and will be responding, in the
ﬁrst place, to the events aﬀecting the whole Euro area. In the presence of
the asymmetric shocks, aﬀecting mainly a given member country, common
monetary policy will be less suited to the current situation of this country,
giving rise to the additional volatility of the economic development and the
associated welfare costs of these ﬂuctuations.
Thus, abstracting from other aspects of monetary integration, our anal-
ysis aims only at assessing the impact of the resignation from autonomous
monetary policy on the volatility of the economic development, measured
byaset of main macroeconomic indicators. We are also going to provide an
estimate of the welfare costs associated with the monetary policy change.
In order to perform this calculation, we propose a Dynamic Stochas-
tic General Equilibrium model (DSGE1)o ftwo economies (Poland and the
1This framework builds on the seminal paper of Kydland and Prescott (1982) and
the Real Business Cycle school, which was enhanced with Keynesian-type of nominal
rigidities, like in the important work of Smets and Wouters (2003), resulting in neoclassical
synthesis - see e.g. Goodfriend and King (1998).1
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Euro area) linked through trade in goods and services and incomplete inter-
national assets markets. In order to specify properly the parameters of the
model, we decided to estimate a relatively large number of parameters using
the data from both economies. It allows us to develop a model that mimics
closely the behaviour of both economies.
The DSGE methodology is relatively well suited to analyse the conse-
quences of the monetary policy regime switch. The model describes the laws
of motion of the economy which are derived from microeconomic founda-
tions. In other words, all agents populating the economy solve well speciﬁed
decision problems and respond in an optimal way to changes in economic
environment. As the economy is described in terms of preferences, technolo-
gies and the rules of market clearing, the model is parametrized in terms of
so called “deep” parameters. It implies that these parameters are invariant
to changes in policies and environments and it is possible to analyse the
consequences of these changes in a way that is immune to the Lucas critique
(see Lucas, 1976). Additionally, agents populating the economy, while mak-
ing their decisions, form expectations (under the assumption of rationality)
about the future, so the model incorporates expectations in an internally
coherent way. All these features make the DSGE framework a parsimo-
nious tool to analyse the consequences of the resignation from autonomous
monetary policy in Poland.
According to the standard economic theory, monetary policy is neutral
in the long run, so the change of the monetary policy regime should not af-
fect the economy in the long run. Thus, the monetary policy regime switch
should inﬂuence the volatility, rather than the level or the growth rate of the
economy. As households are usually assumed to be risk averse, they dislike
high variation in income and consumption, thus higher volatility of the eco-
nomic growth generates the welfare costs for households. Since households
preferences are directly speciﬁed in the DSGE framework, we are able to as-
sess the consequences of Euro adoption not only in terms of the volatility of
macroeconomics variables (as in Karam, Laxton, Rose, and Tamirisa, 2008),
but also in terms of the consumer welfare (as in Lucas, 1987).
Our approach is directly related to the literature on the costs of busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations, which starts from the seminal contribution of Lucas
(1987). Lucas ﬁnds that the costs of economic ﬂuctuations are quite small -
his estimate for the US economy implies that individuals would sacriﬁce at
most 0.1% of their lifetime consumption (his point estimate under reason-
able calibration of the prototype economy amounts to 0.008%). The result
of Lucas was quite controversial and launched subsequent research. Barlevy
(2004a) reviews the literature on this topic and ﬁnds that the estimates of
the costs of business cycles range from 0.01% to 2% of lifetime consumption.
The higher estimates are usually obtained with either non-standard prefer-
ences (e.g. Epstein-Zin) or high risk aversion (calibrated to match household
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The standard models of the business cycle ﬂuctuations generate relatively
low estimates of the business cycle costs. On the one hand, when thinking
about ﬂuctuations one usually thinks of recessions, as times when people are
worse oﬀ, but the lack of economic ﬂuctuations also means that there are
no economic expansions (when individuals are actually better oﬀ). On the
other hand, since agents dislike economic ﬂuctuations, they do their best
to smooth them out. Additionally, the standard models of business cycle
ﬂuctuations imply that there are no long-run consequences of these, so there
is no level eﬀect of ﬂuctuations (and thus the magnitude of the welfare loses
is of the second order).
There is also literature which argues that there is a level eﬀect. The so-
called endogenous business cycle literature (see e.g. Barlevy, 2004b) assumes
that there are long run eﬀects of economic ﬂuctuations, so ﬂuctuations have
the level eﬀect on welfare, which results in much higher costs of cyclical
ﬂuctuations - an order of magnitude higher, e.g. 8% in Barlevy (2004b).
This approach builds mainly on the empirical evidence showing that higher
volatility of economic growth is usually associated with lower average growth
rates. But the tools of this approach are mostly econometric, thus the causal-
ity still remains unsolved. As far as we know, there does not exist a general
equilibrium model incorporating these relationships, which is well grounded
in the data. Due to this shortcoming and the fact that the literature on the
endogenous cycle is not in the mainstream of economic thinking, we choose
the ﬁrst approach to the business cycle.
The literature on the costs of the Euro adoption (or more broadly - mon-
etary union) is rather limited. Ca’ Zorzi, De Santis, and Zampolli (2005)
argue that adopting the Euro is more likely to be welfare enhancing, the
higher the relative volatility of supply shocks across the participating coun-
tries, the smaller the correlation of countries’ supply shocks and the larger
the variance of real exchange rate shocks. Additionally, the welfare eﬀects
do not depend on deterministic factors inﬂuencing the real exchange rate
(such as Balassa-Samuelson eﬀect), but rather on variances and covariances
of shocks. They also claim, that the Euro area accession decreases the ef-
fectiveness of the monetary policy response to the stochastic shocks, so it
creates a cost of monetary union. However, the Euro adoption could be
beneﬁcial if the positive impact on potential output (through the trade cre-
ation channel) is higher than the negative eﬀect of lower monetary policy
eﬀectiveness.
Karam, Laxton, Rose, and Tamirisa (2008) use a DSGE model developed
in the IMF to assess the implications of the Euro adoption on the volatility
of an accessing country (the model is roughly calibrated to data from the
Czech Republic - the authors argue that it is a typical New Member econ-
omy2). Their results show that the accession of a small country to the Euro
2This argument is very stylized as there are many features that distinguish Eastern
European countries, especially in terms of volatility of GDP components - for some dis-
cussion, see Choueiri, Murgasova, and Sz´ ekely (2005).1
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area increases the volatility of both inﬂation and output, as the exchange
rate no longer buﬀers a part of the volatility generated by economic shocks3.
The increase of the volatility of the economic ﬂuctuations gets smaller with
the ﬁercer competition in the goods market, the smaller rigidities, and the
greater trade integration with the Euro area. The approach of Karam, Lax-
ton, Rose, and Tamirisa (2008) provides many interesting answers, although
it focuses on the volatility eﬀects of Euro adoption, emphasizing the problem
of the inﬂation-output volatility faced by the central bank. They do not try
to quantify the welfare results of the Euro area accession.
Lopes (2007) uses a framework that is the most closely related to ours.
She also uses a symmetric two-country DSGE model, with capital and nom-
inal rigidities4, but she calibrates all of the model parameters. The latter
is relatively hard in case of the New Member States as the research on
technologies, preferences and market structures in these economies is rather
scarce. She ﬁnds the welfare costs of losing monetary policy independence
to be 0.25% of lifetime consumption (in case of Poland). We believe that
her result might be biased since, as far as we understand, it is based on only
one draw of random shocks for about 1000 periods. Our experiments show
that one needs a large number of draws for the convergence of the welfare
result. She also ﬁnds the level eﬀects, which in our computations disappear
as the number of draws increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe our
basic model economy. Section 3 discusses the calibration and the estimation
issues and shows the performance of the model, both in terms of impulse
response functions and moments of the model variables against the data. In
Section 4 we present and discuss the results of the model both in terms of
the volatilities of economic aggregates, as well as in terms of the consumer
welfare. Section 5 concludes the paper.
3The authors argue that “...ﬂexible exchange rate plays an important buﬀering role
that facilitates macroeconomic adjustment to shocks in small, emerging economies, which
allows the central bank to achieve better outcomes in terms of domestic volatility. In
general, the results show that there is a cost to a small, emerging economy in joining a
common currency area when this ﬂexibility is lost. The essential reason is that there are
rigidities in domestic adjustment, and when the burden of macroeconomic adjustment
is forced onto domestic nominal variables under the common currency, macroeconomic
volatility generally increases...” - Karam, Laxton, Rose, and Tamirisa (2008), page 354.
4Although she uses the staggered price setting in the spirit of Taylor (1980) and we
choose a framework of Calvo (1983), that is more frequently used in the DSGE literature.10
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2M o del
We employ the standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model of
business cycle with nominal rigidities. In our model, monopolistic produc-
ers set prices in a style proposed by Calvo (1983). We build a two country
model in the tradition of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002). In the model
we name Poland home and the Eurozone foreign. Monetary policy is mod-
elled as an interest rate rule similar to the one proposed by Taylor (1993).
Our model shares many features with closed economy models (including
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, 2000, Smets and Wouters, 2003), and small
open macro economy models (including Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Lind´ e, 2005, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans, 2005, Adolfson, Las´ een,
Lind´ e, and Villani, 2005), and other two country models (including Lopes,
2007 and Rabanal and Tuesta, 2007).
Households can save in domestic bonds and/or international bonds. We
assume that domestic bonds markets are complete but international bonds
markets are incomplete. Introduction of this market structure leads to the
arbitrage condition that in a log-linearised version takes a form of the uncov-
ered interest rate parity (UIP) condition. Households also decide how much
capital to rent to producers (utilization rate) and choose how much to invest
in new capital. Furthermore, households supply labour in the competitive
labour market.
There are three stages of the production process. In the ﬁrst stage pro-
ducers oﬀer diﬀerentiated products to both domestic and foreign second
stage producers. They set their prices according to the Calvo scheme. By
including the nominal rigidities in the buyer’s currency, we obtain the in-
complete exchange rate pass-through. In the remaining two stages, perfectly
competitive producers combine those diﬀerentiated goods into a single con-
sumption/investment good with domestic and foreign component.
Next, we describe in detail the optimization problems of consumers and
producers as well as the behaviour of ﬁscal and monetary authorities.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households of measure 1. The fraction ω of house-
holds reside in the home country and the fraction 1−ω of households reside
in the foreign country. Herein we describe the problem of the home coun-
try household. The problem of the foreign country household is deﬁned
analogously.
Households supply labour, consume goods, trade domestic bonds in the
complete markets, and international bonds in the incomplete markets. They
also choose the capital utilization rate and accumulate capital. The repre-
sentative household’s preferences are of the form 5
5The convention employed in this paper is that asterisk denotes the counterpart in2
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where ct and lt denote the representative household’s consumption and
labour supply, respectively. ζt denotes the labour supply shock that follows
AR(1) process
ˆ ζt = ρζˆ ζt−1 + εζ,t, (2)
where Et [ζt]=1a n dˆ ζt = ζt − 1 (in the deterministic steady state ¯ ζ = 1).













We restrict our analysis to the case of a representative consumer by as-
suming complete domestic ﬁnancial markets. In period t there is a complete
set of state contingent one-period nominal bonds Bt+1,e ach worth Υt,t+1.
Households can also trade bonds with abroad. We assume that there is
one, internationally traded, uncontingent nominal bond, nominated in the
foreign currency D∗
t+1 (denote the home country holdings of this bond as
D∗
H,t+1, and the foreign country holdings of this bond as D∗
F,t+1). From the
point of view of the home country households the interest rate on this bond
is R∗
tκt, where κt denotes risk premium. The risk premium is a function of











where et, Pt and ˜ Yt denote the nominal exchange rate, the price of the
consumption good and GDP, respectively. The constant d is calibrated so
that there is no risk premium in the deterministic steady state.  κ,t denotes
the risk premium shock that follows AR(1) process
ˆ  κ,t = ρκˆ  κ,t−1 + εζ,t, (5)
where Et [ k,t]=1and ˆ  k,t =  k,t − 1 (in the deterministic steady state
¯  k = 1).
Moreover, households accumulate capital. The dynamics of the stock of
capital follows the law of motion








the foreign country of a variable in the home country (for example ct is consumption in
the home country, and c∗
t is consumption in the foreign country). The same applies to
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where ˜ kt and xt denote the capital stock and investment. S (xt/xt+1)i sa
function which transforms investment into physical capital and introduces
the capital adjustment costs into the model. We adopt the speciﬁcation of
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and assume that in the determin-
istic steady state there are no capital adjustment costs (S (1) = S  (1) = 0),
and the function is concave in the neighbourhood of the deterministic steady
state (ι =1 /S   (1) > 0). Households also choose the capital utilization rate6
ut ∈ [0,∞), and have to pay the capital utilization rate adjustment costs
Ψ(ut)˜ kt, where Ψ(ut)i sincreasing and convex. Furthermore, we assume no
utilization adjustment cost in the deterministic steady state, so the function
Ψ(ut) satisﬁes Ψ(1) = 0, Ψ  (1) > 0 and Ψ   (1) > 0. Moreover, households
rent capital to producers. Denote the capital stock employed by producers
as kt, then
kt = ut˜ kt (7)
and the rental rate of capital is denoted as rt.
All households in the home country face the same budget constraint in
each period
















− Tt +Π t, (8)
where Pt, wt, Tt and Πt denote the price of consumption good, the real wage
rate, real lump sum tax and real proﬁts from all producers, respectively.
The representative home country household maximizes (1) subject to the
budget constraint (8) (denote the Lagrangian multiplier on budget constraint
as λt), the law of motion of capital (6) (denote the Lagrangian multiplier
on budget constraint as λtQt), and the standard no-Ponzi game condition.
6ut is normalized, so that 1 denotes the deterministic steady state capacity utilization
rate.
Solving, we get the following ﬁrst order conditions
ct : β
tuc,t = λt, (9)
lt : β
tul,t = −λtwt, (10)































˜ kt+1 : Et [λt+1 (rt+1ut+1 − Ψ(ut+1))] = Qtλt−
− Et [Qt+1λt+1 (1 − δ)], (12)
ut : rt =Ψ
  (ut), (13)2
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= Et [Υt,t+1]. (16)
The log-linearised equations can be found in Appendix A.
2.2 Producers
Herein we describe the actions of producers in the home country, produc-
ers in the foreign country act analogously. There are three stages of the
production process in both economies. We describe the decision problems
of the producers, moving from the the top (ﬁnal good producers), through
the middle (homogeneous intermediate good producers), to the bottom (het-
erogeneous intermediate good producers) of the production process in the
economy.
In the last stage, ﬁnal domestic goods producers buy home and foreign
homogeneous intermediate goods and combine them into domestic consump-
tion/investment goods that are sold to consumers. In the second stage there
are two sectors: H and F.I nsector H producers buy home heterogeneous
intermediate goods and aggregate them into home homogeneous intermedi-
ate goods that are sold to the domestic ﬁnal goods producers. Similarly in
sector F, producers buy foreign heterogeneous intermediate goods and ag-
gregate them into foreign homogeneous intermediate goods that are sold to
the domestic ﬁnal goods producers. In the ﬁrst stage, heterogeneous inter-
mediate goods producers use capital and labour to produce heterogeneous
intermediate goods that are sold both at home and at foreign. Next we
describe the problems of producers in the home country in more detail. In
terms of notation, goods produced at home are sub-scripted with an H, while
those produced abroad are sub-scripted with an F. Moreover, allocations
and prices in the foreign country are denoted with an asterisk.
2.2.1 Final Goods Producers
Final goods producers operate in a perfectly competitive market. They buy
sector H homogeneous intermediate goods YH,t and sector F homogeneous
intermediate goods YF,t at competitive prices PH,t and PF,t, respectively. The
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which are sold to home country consumers. Since markets are competitive,
the ﬁnal good producers take prices as given and, in each period t,c h o ose
inputs and output to maximize proﬁts given by
PtYt − PH,tYH,t − PF,tYF,t (18)
subject to the production function (17).


























2.2.2 Homogeneous Intermediate Goods Producers
Home and foreign homogeneous intermediate goods producers operate in a
competitive market. Home homogeneous intermediate goods producers buy
ac ontinuum of home heterogeneous intermediate goods yH(i), i ∈ [0,1],
while foreign homogeneous intermediate goods producers F buy a contin-
uum of foreign heterogeneous intermediate goods yF(i), i ∈ [0,1]. Prices
of both home and foreign heterogeneous intermediate goods are set in a
currency of the home country, denoted as pH,t(i) and pF,t(i), respectively.










Given prices, in each period t, the home homogeneous intermediate goods





subject to the production function (22).
Solving the problem of the producers in (23) we obtain the following
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The problem of the foreign homogeneous intermediate goods producers is


















2.2.3 Heterogeneous Intermediate Goods Producers
The technology for producing each heterogeneous intermediate good i ∈ [0,1]









where kt(i) and lt(i) are the inputs of capital and labour, respectively, while
yH(i) and y∗
H(i) are the amounts of the home intermediate heterogeneous
good i sold in the home country and in the foreign country7, respectively.
Moreover zt denotes the stationary technology shock that follows an AR(1)
process
ˆ zt = ρzˆ zt−1 + εz,t, (29)
where Et [zt]=1and ˆ zt = zt − 1 (in the deterministic steady state ¯ z = 1).
Next we ﬁnd the cost function to simplify notationally the proﬁt max-
imization problem. The cost minimization problem of the producer i in
period t is as follows
c(yt(i)) = min
kt(i),lt(i)
[rtkt (i)+wtlt (i)] (30)
subject to (28), where rt and wt are the gross nominal rental rate of capi-
tal and the real wage, respectively. Solving (30) we get the following cost
function
c(yt(i)) = mctyt (i), (31)









over, from the cost minimization problem we get the following condition for
the optimal inputs employment ratio
7Note that y∗














The producer of the home heterogeneous intermediate good i sells her
products both to home homogeneous intermediate good producers and for-
eign homogeneous intermediate good producers. Since no two goods are
the same, its producers operate in a monopolistically competitive market
and have market power. We assume that the producers set their prices
according to the Calvo scheme which introduces price stickiness into the
model. Furthermore, the prices are sticky in a buyers currency, which is
consistent with the incomplete short term pass-through. Since the marginal
cost function is constant in yt(i), we can write down the separate proﬁt
maximization problems for goods sold in the home country and the foreign
country. In each period, the producer of good i, while selling her goods
in the home country yH(i), with probability (1 − θH) receives a signal to
adjust her price, otherwise the price evolves according to the following for-
mula pH,t+1 (i)=pH,t(i)¯ π, where ¯ π denotes the deterministic steady state
inﬂation in the home country. If the producer receives the signal for price
reoptimalization it sets the new price pnew
H,t (i) that maximizes her proﬁts













subject to the demand function (24), where Λt,t+j denotes the intertemporal
discount factor (consistent with the home country households problem), and
τH denotes the production subsidy8.
Similarly, the producer of good i, while selling her product in the for-
eign country, in each period with probability (1 − θ∗
H) reoptimizes her price
and with probability θ∗
H the price evolves according to the following for-
8We assume that the subsidy is set by respective governments to eliminate the monop-






H,t(i)¯ π∗, where ¯ π∗ denotes the deterministic steady state
inﬂation in the foreign country. While reoptimizing the producer chooses
p
new,∗
























subject to the demand function (26), where et+j denotes the nominal ex-
change rate (price of the foreign currency in the home currency), and τ∗
H
denotes the foreign production subsidy.2
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Deﬁne the real exchange rate as qt =
etP∗
t
Pt . Solving the problems (33)












































Thus the producer sets its price so that discounted real marginal revenue
is equal to discounted real marginal cost, in expected value. Note that if
θ =0we obtain the standard condition that price equals marginal cost. The
log-linearised equations can be found in Appendix A.
2.3 Government
Ag overnment uses lump sum taxes to ﬁnance government expenditure and








τFpF,t(i)yF,t(i)di = Tt. (37)
Since in our framework Ricardian equivalence holds there is no need to intro-
duce government debt. Moreover, we assume that government expenditures
are driven by a simple autoregressive process
Gt+1 =( 1− ρg)µg + ρgGt + εg,t+1. (38)
2.4 Central Bank
As it is common in the New-Keynesian literature, we assume that monetary
policy is conducted according to a Taylor rule (we apply the concept of an
extended Taylor rule, similar to the one assumed by Smets and Wouters
(2003)) that targets deviations from the deterministic steady state inﬂation,
GDP, the growth rate of inﬂation and the growth rate of GDP, allowing
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2.6 Balance of Payments and GDP
Using the market clearing conditions and the budget constraint we get the




















(1 + τF)pF,t(i)yF,t(i)di + etD
∗
H,t. (45)
Furthermore, to close the model, since there is GDP in the Taylor rule we
need the formula for GDP, which has the following form
where πt = Pt
Pt−1, and ¯ π, ¯ ˜ Y denote the deterministic steady state values of
inﬂation and GDP, respectively. It’s worth noting that the Taylor rule plays
ak ey role in bringing stability to the model and determining the reaction of
the model economy to exogenous shocks9.
2.5 Market Clearing.
In equilibrium, the goods markets, the assets markets and the production
factors markets must clear.
The market clearing condition in the ﬁnal goods market takes the form
ct + xt + Gt +Ψ( ut)kt = Yt. (40)
Note that we have included the market clearing condition in the intermediate
goods markets using notation.
The market clearing condition in the production factors markets are
 1
0
lt (i)di = lt, (41)
 1
0
kt (i)di = kt. (42)
Since domestic bonds cannot be traded internationally and the govern-
ments budgets are balanced, the market clearing conditions for domestic









F,t+1 =0 . (44)
9For discussion see Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005).2
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(1 + τF)pF,t(i)yF,t(i)di. (46)
The log-linearised equations can be found in Appendix A.20
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3 Calibration and estimation
In order to evaluate the properties of the model against the data describing
Polish and the Eurozone economies, we applied a mixture of calibration and
estimation procedures. First, we calibrated a subset of parameters that can
be easily extracted from the raw data or those resulting from the steady
state considerations. Afterwards, we performed a Bayesian estimation of
the other parameters, that mainly govern the business cycle volatility of the
model.
3.1 Calibration Procedure
The calibration of the parameters was based mainly on the data from the
quarterly National Accounts, issued either by the Eurostat (in case of the
Eurozone10), or by the Polish Central Statistical Oﬃce (GUS). As a measure
of exports and imports we used the data from the Polish National Accounts,
then we adjusted the Eurozone data, treating the resulting additional net
trade with the rest of the world as government consumption11. Due to the
lack of data on average hours worked, we used employment as a proxy for
a measure of labor in the model. We used the data on total employment
(domestic concept) form the Eurostat, in case of the Eurozone, and the data
on employment form the Labor Force Study, in case of Poland. As a measure
of wages, we used quarterly data on average wages in the national economy,
in case of Poland (due to the lack of data on the compensation of employees
for the whole period) and data on compensation of employees per person
employed, in case of the Eurozone.
Table 1: The most important calibrated parameters of the model
Parameter ββ ∗ δδ ∗ 1+µ
µ
1+µ∗
µ∗ ηη ∗ αα ∗
Value 0.99 0.99 0.017 0.017 2 2 0.61 0.99 0.33 0.33
The most important calibrated parameters of the model can be found
in Table 1. The discount factors β and β∗ were set at the same levels12 of
0.99, which implies the annual long-term real interest rate of 4%, consistent
with the average real interest rate (3-months interest rate deﬂated by the
expected inﬂation, under assumption of a perfect foresight) in the Eurozone
for the period 1995-2007. The physical capital depreciation rate δ was set at
10The Eurozone is deﬁned as EA-15 and includes: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Ire-
land, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal,
Slovenia, and Finland.
11In a a two country framework one need to decide how to deal with the trade with
rest of the world. Treating it as government consumption in our framework is relatively
nondistortionary, as it only aﬀect the steady state government consumption share and is
roughly in line with the approach of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007).
12In order to avoid the steady state eﬀects of monetary policy regime change, we used
the same discount factor for both economies which was set at the level consistent with
the Eurozone.3
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7% annually in both countries. The elasticity of production with respect to
capital, α was set at 0.33 in both countries, in line with most of the DSGE
literature. The long-term inﬂation rate was set at 2.5% annually for both
economies. The share of the population of Poland in the total population of
the Eurozone and Poland, ω was set at 0.107, on the basis of the data from
the Eurostat.
The parameters µ and µ∗ were set at 1 in both countries, implying the
Armington elasticity of substitution
1+µ
µ =2 ,consistently with the evi-
dence given by Ruhl (2005) and discussion presented in McDaniel and Bal-
istreri (2003). The home bias parameters, η and η∗ were set at 0.614 and
0.9903 respectively, reﬂecting the export to absorption ratios for the period
2004 − 2007 in case of Poland and 1995 − 2007 in case of the Eurozone.
The steady state consumption shares (in absorption) were set at 0.609 and
0.573 in Poland and the Eurozone, respectively. The corresponding ﬁgures
for investment shares are 0.206 and 0.2095. We treat the government expen-
ditures share as a residual. The absorption to GDP ratios were set at 1.03
and 0.99 in Poland and the Eurozone. We set the debt share at 0.46, in line
with the average ratio of total external debt of the Polish economy to GDP
for the years 2005 − 2007. Some other parameters of the model, that were
not estimated were calculated on the basis of the steady-state relations of
the model.
3.2 Estimation Procedure
All data used in the estimation of the model were expressed in quarterly
frequency and adjusted for seasonality (except for the interest rates) using
Demetra package and expressed in constant prices from the year 2000. As the
model does not distinguish between diﬀerent price indicators and monetary
policy is aimed at stabilizing the consumer price inﬂation, we decided to
express all real variables in terms of consumption prices either in Poland or
in the Eurozone. We also normalized the variables by the population shares
ω and 1 − ω in each quarter13. Then, the logarithms of all variables were
detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter (see Hodrick and Prescott, 1997),
with the standard parameter for the quarterly data λ = 1600, and expressed
as a log-diﬀerence of a given variable and HP-trend, which is consistent with
the log-linearisation of the model.
Our approach was to keep the basic structure of the model relatively sim-
ple and to use a relatively small number of fundamental stochastic shocks
to describe the cyclical ﬂuctuations of the economy (we used technology,
government consumption, monetary policy, and labor supply14 shocks for
13As there are no consistently measured quarterly data for the Eurozone, we extrapo-
lated the annual data using constant quarterly growth rates within a year, assuring that
the data for the beginning of the year are the same as measured by annual data.
14Especially in case of Poland, it is very hard to model the labor market variables using
a relatively simple concept of labor market equilibrium, as in the presented model. So22
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both countries and risk premium shocks). But this approach would limit
the information that is used in the estimation, as the number of observed
variables needs to be equal to the number of stochastic shocks. So, in the
estimation of the parameters, we included additional information form other
variables, assuming that they are observed with an iid noise. As primarily
variables (observed without noise), we used the following time series for the
period IIIQ1996−IVQ2007 for both Poland and the Eurozone: GDP, gov-
ernment expenditure, consumer price inﬂation, employment and the interest
rate diﬀerential (in gross terms, compatible with the deﬁnition of ˆ R− ˆ R∗ in
the model). The set of additional variables (observed with noise) includes
(for both economies): consumption, investments and trade indicators (both
exports and imports, expressed in Polish currency).
As the model is log-linearised, it can be expressed as a state-space repre-
sentation and it’s likelihood can be evaluated against data via the Kalman
ﬁlter. We decided to use the Bayesian approach to estimate the model pa-
rameters, since it allows to use additional information, that can be provided
via the prior distribution of the parameters. The expression for the likeli-
hood function cannot be found analytically, however the posterior distribu-
tion of the model parameters can be estimated via Monte Carlo Markov
Chain (MCMC) algorithm, proposed by Metropolis, Rosenbluth, Rosen-
bluth, Teller, , and Teller (1953) and Hastings (1970). We used the Dynare
package in order to solve, estimate and simulate the model (see e.g. Juillard
(1996)).
After ﬁnding the mode of the posterior distribution (using the Chris Sims
csminwel procedure that applies a quasi-Newton method with the BFGS
update of the estimated inverse Hessian, robust against cliﬀs, i.e. hyper-
plane discontinuities) we applied the Metropolis-Hastings MCMC algorithm
with 50000 replications (to assure that the MCMS algorithm converges) in
two blocks in order to compute the posterior distribution of the model pa-
rameter. The acceptation rates were ca. 24%, within the band 23%-25%
recommended in the literature. On the basis of the the univariate and mul-
tivariate convergence diagnostic of Brooks and Gelman (1998) indicating
that the MCMC algorithm converged, we dropped 10% of draws for the
purpose of construction of the posterior probability distributions.
When choosing the parameters of the prior distributions, we used the
results of Smets and Wouters (2003), Adolfson, Las´ een, Lind´ e, and Villani
(2005) and Kolasa (2008) and, to some extent, some pre-estimation exer-
cises. To simplify notation we denoted
Ψ (1)
Ψ  (1) as Ψ. The chosen parameters
of the prior distribution are presented in Table 2. In most cases we have
not distinguished between Poland and the Eurozone, except for ι’s, Calvo
probabilities15 θ’s and parameters of the Taylor rule. As the installation
we decided to add labor supply shocks, in order to allow the model to have a chance to
describe the labor market behaviour in line with the data.
15Note, that here by Calvo probability we mean probability that a price is not adjusted
and Teller (1953) and Hastings (1970).
in a given period. Thus the higher Calvo probability the less often prices are adjusted.3
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Table 2: Basic description of the prior and posterior distributions
Parameter Prior distribution Posterior distribution
type Mean St. Dev. Mode Mean St. Dev.
ι norm 0.10 0.025 0.087 0.088 0.023
ι∗ norm 0.30 0.025 0.347 0.346 0.024
Ψ norm 0.20 0.075 0.240 0.242 0.071
Ψ∗ norm 0.20 0.075 0.301 0.305 0.068
γ norm 4.00 0.250 4.056 4.053 0.246
γ∗ norm 4.00 0.250 4.053 4.053 0.245
θH beta 0.60 0.080 0.443 0.446 0.053
θ∗
F beta 0.70 0.080 0.500 0.502 0.043
θF beta 0.60 0.080 0.791 0.762 0.082
θ∗
H beta 0.70 0.080 0.722 0.708 0.068
χ norm 0.05 0.030 0.078 0.078 0.026
σ norm 2.00 0.300 3.144 3.157 0.242
σ∗ norm 2.00 0.300 1.416 1.467 0.214
γR beta 0.82 0.020 0.714 0.714 0.019
γπ norm 1.25 0.070 1.289 1.305 0.084
γy norm 0.40 0.050 0.464 0.459 0.051
γdπ norm 0.20 0.030 0.200 0.199 0.030
γdy norm 0.10 0.020 0.108 0.107 0.020
γ∗
R beta 0.80 0.020 0.760 0.758 0.020
γ∗
π norm 1.30 0.080 1.497 1.497 0.071
γ∗
y norm 0.30 0.060 0.187 0.210 0.061
γ∗
dπ norm 0.20 0.030 0.205 0.202 0.030
γ∗
dy norm 0.10 0.020 0.099 0.098 0.020
ρz beta 0.95 0.010 0.943 0.942 0.011
ρ∗
z beta 0.95 0.010 0.943 0.941 0.010
ρG beta 0.85 0.100 0.632 0.642 0.115
ρ∗
G beta 0.85 0.100 0.934 0.918 0.026
ρl beta 0.60 0.100 0.765 0.753 0.056
ρ∗
l beta 0.60 0.100 0.743 0.731 0.053
ρaκ beta 0.60 0.100 0.556 0.543 0.062
σz inv gamma 0.06 ∞ 0.012 0.012 0.002
σz∗ inv gamma 0.005 ∞ 0.004 0.004 0.0004
σϕ inv gamma 0.02 ∞ 0.009 0.010 0.001
σϕ∗ inv gamma 0.006 ∞ 0.002 0.002 0.0004
σG inv gamma 0.02 ∞ 0.016 0.017 0.002
σG∗ inv gamma 0.02 ∞ 0.018 0.018 0.002
σl inv gamma 0.04 ∞ 0.040 0.041 0.005
σl∗ inv gamma 0.01 ∞ 0.012 0.012 0.002
σaκ inv gamma 0.05 ∞ 0.023 0.025 0.004
of the new investments goods in Poland could be more costly, due to more
constricted regulations we chose lower value for ι than for ι∗. Also, due to
less stringent product market regulations in Poland, we pick slightly lower
Calvo probabilities for Poland than for the Eurozone. Additionally, taking
into account the results of Kolasa (2008), we picked such prior distributions
of the parameters of the Taylor rule, that the policy rule in the Eurozone
is slightly more inﬂation oriented than in Poland. The standard deviations
of the stochastic shocks were set on the basis of the pre-estimation exercise.24
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For standard deviations of the noise components of the additional observed
variables, we assumed that the variability of the noise component equals 1%
of the overall variability of a given variable.
3.3 Parameters
The results of the estimation procedure are shown in Table 2. Additionally,
we plotted the prior and posterior distributions of all estimated parameters
- see Figure 1, including the standard deviations of the noisy components of
the additional variables16.
The results of the estimation indicate that our assumption of the relative
size of the parameter governing the cost of capital adjustment was correct.
Also, the additional information from the data have not changed strongly the
prior distribution of the labor supply elasticity. The estimated coeﬃcients of
the Calvo parameters indicate that the degree of nominal rigidity in Poland
is lower than in the Eurozone, especially in case of goods sold domestically.
The estimated Calvo probabilities for the Eurozone are roughly in line with
the results of Adolfson, Las´ een, Lind´ e, and Villani (2005).
The information in the data series signiﬁcantly changed the estimate of
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in Poland - the
estimated parameter σ =3 .2i sm uch higher than the mean of the prior,
which was set at 2.
The estimated interest rate smoothing coeﬃcient in the Taylor rule for
Polish economy proved to be lower than expected, γR =0 .71, although
within the range usually obtained in the literature. Additionally, the re-
sponsiveness of the interest rate to the consumer price inﬂation and GDP
is slightly higher than assumed, both in case of Poland and the Eurozone.
The estimated degree of the interest rate smoothing of the ECB γR∗ =0 .76,
is slightly lower than the usual estimates (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2003
or Adolfson, Las´ een, Lind´ e, and Villani, 2005). The estimated Taylor rules
are as follows
ˆ Rt =0 .71 ˆ Rt−1 +0 .29[1.31ˆ πt +0 .46ˆ ˜ Yt +0 .11 ˆ d˜ Yt +0 .2 ˆ dπt]+ϕt, (47)
16These are the plots of: SE e c, SE e c s, SE e x, SE e x s, SE e import, SE e export.
in case of the NBP, and
ˆ R
∗
t =0 .76 ˆ R
∗
t−1 +0 .24[1.5ˆ π
∗
t +0 .21ˆ ˜ Y
∗
t +0 .1 ˆ d˜ Y
∗





in case of the ECB.
The estimated persistence of the technology shocks is very similar in
Poland and in the Eurozone, roughly equal to 0.94. The estimation revealed
that the persistence of the government spending shocks is much higher in
the Eurozone than in Poland, in line with the economic intuition. Also, the
persistence of the labor supply shocks proved to be higher in case of Poland,3
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reﬂecting the features of the transforming economy. The persistence of the
risk premium shocks proved to be relatively small, also in line with the
economic intuition17.
The estimated volatilities of the shocks governing the evolution of the
economy (reported in last rows of Table 2) reveal that the volatility of the
technology shocks is much larger in Poland, again in line with the economic
intuition and with the evidence from the relative volatility of output of
the Polish economy compared to the Eurozone. The same applies for the
monetary policy shocks and the labor supply shocks. On the other hand,
the volatility of the government spending shocks is slightly higher in the
Eurozone, than in Poland.
17Taking into account the fact that adjustments of the exchange rate are relatively fast,
it is not surprising that agents respond relatively quickly to the exogenous changes in the
interest rate disparities.
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3.4 Model’s Data Fit
In order to evaluate the ability of the model to replicate the features of
the data from the Polish and the Eurozone economies, we compared the
moments of the model generated variables against the moments of the data.
Instead, we could have had used the theoretical moments of the model’s vari-
ables, but these describe the large sample properties of the model, whereas
to calculate the moments of the data we can use only ca. 50 observations.
In order to overcome this issue we decided to simulate the model behaviour
in a short sample. So, we simulated the model using random draws of the
stochastic shocks18 for 152 periods and then dropped the ﬁrst 100 obser-
vations19, calculating the moments for only 52 observations. We replicated
this procedure 10000 times (for diﬀerent, independent draws of the stochas-
tic shocks) and computed the averages of the model generated moments in
order to assure that the calculated moments are history-independent.
Table 3 shows the results of this procedure. The upper panel shows
18As was mentioned earlier, the additional shocks of the model - noise in additional
observables - were used only for the purpose of the estimation, so in the simulations
performed on the model, we turned oﬀ these shocks.
19As the simulation starts from the deterministic steady state, we dropped some obser-
vations to assure that we calculate the moments of variables not being biased by being
too close to the steady state.
Table 3: Moments of the model generated variables against the data
Volatility Correlation with GDP Persistence
data model data model data model
Poland
˜ Y 0.020 0.025 1.000 1.000 0.403 0.597
c 0.010 0.011 0.611 0.245 0.806 0.738
x 0.089 0.046 0.874 0.481 0.800 0.988
π 0.010 0.022 -0.276 -0.187 -0.279 0.696
w 0.012 0.026 0.464 0.517 0.662 0.536
R 0.021 0.019 0.282 -0.445 0.849 0.864
l 0.015 0.012 0.601 0.250 0.928 0.750
q 0.061 0.043 0.118 0.706 0.813 0.382
export 0.048 0.048 0.337 0.792 0.812 0.432
import 0.062 0.018 0.517 0.259 0.765 0.654
Eurozone
˜ Y ∗ 0.006 0.010 1.000 1.000 0.817 0.843
c∗ 0.006 0.008 0.842 0.329 0.868 0.825
x∗ 0.027 0.035 0.758 0.513 0.935 0.981
π∗ 0.003 0.007 0.288 -0.138 0.215 0.396
w∗ 0.004 0.013 0.617 0.766 0.646 0.510
R∗ 0.006 0.004 0.635 -0.660 0.896 0.838
l∗ 0.005 0.004 0.805 0.459 0.948 0.664
the results for the Polish economy, and the lower panel for the Eurozone
economy. The ﬁrst two columns show the volatilities of the model generated
variables against the data (measured by the standard deviations), the middle3
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two columns show the cyclicality of variables, as measured by correlations
with GDP (GDP ∗ in case of the Eurozone). The last columns show the
persistence of the model generated variables and the data - measured by
autocorrelation.
The model generates too much volatility of GDP, both in Poland and in
the Eurozone. The same is true for inﬂation and real wage (and investment
in case of the Eurozone economy). The model correctly reproduces, for both
economies, the volatilities of consumption, the nominal interest rate, and
exports. The volatilities of investment in Poland and employment in both
economies, as well as imports were underestimated by the model.
Our model generates too little comovement with output in case of con-
sumption, investments, employment and imports in case of Poland. The
same is true for consumption and employment in case of the Eurozone. The
cyclicality of the real exchange rate is largely exaggerated by the model.
The model predicts countercyclical inﬂation in the Eurozone, whereas it is
slightly procyclical in the data. Also the cyclicality of the nominal interest
rate is diﬀerent in the model and data for both economies - in the data the
nominal interest rate is procyclical (slightly procyclical in case of Poland),
whereas the model predicts the nominal interest rate is countercyclical (the
procyclically of interest rates in the data is rather not intuitive and could be
an artifact of the short sample used in the analysis). Generally the model
Figure 2: Impulse response to the asymmetric technology shock






















































reproduces well the persistence of the analysed variables - excluding the real
exchange rate, exports, and especially inﬂation.28
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Summing up, the model ﬁts the data relatively well, although not per-
fectly. The main problems are: exchange rate (even with the equity premium
puzzle shocks the model cannot generate the properties of this variable, but
this is rather common to this kind of methodology - see e.g. Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan, 2002), cyclicality of the interest rates, and cyclicality of
inﬂation (the latter in case of the Eurozone). Overall we think that the
performance of the model is rather good.
3.5 Impulse Response Functions
In order to understand the dynamic properties of the model, we calculated
the impulse response of the model to the most important shocks of the model
- asymmetric technology shock and asymmetric monetary policy shock (that
occurred in the Polish economy).
3.5.1 Asymmetric Technology Shock
After an unanticipated asymmetric technology shock (hitting the Polish
economy, see Figure 2) the model predicts the prolonged increase of both
consumption and investments, the latter generating the increase of capital
stock. The decrease of the domestic prices translates into falling inﬂation
Figure 3: Impulse response to the asymmetric monetary policy shock























































and a decline of the nominal interest rates. Real wages decrease on impact,
but then quickly rise above the steady state and stay there for a while. The
technology shock proved to be labor-saving, resulting in a drop of employ-3
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ment for the ﬁrst 10 quarters. This eﬀect is a standard feature of the sticky
price models, which is highly debated in the literature20. After a couple of
quarters employment recovers and at some point it even goes over its steady
state value. With lower employment (and higher labor productivity) and
higher capital, GDP rises and then slowly returns to its steady state.
Higher level of activity in the Polish economy translates into a decrease
of foreign debt - domestic agents use the period of higher activity of the
economy and higher income to pay back some of the debt they have against
the foreign agents. Higher productivity in the domestic economy, results in
a decline of the real exchange rate (i.e. exchange rate appreciates in real
terms). After about 6−8y ears after the shock the economy converges back
to the steady state.
3.5.2 Asymmetric Monetary Policy Shock
Figure 3 presents the response of the model economy to an unanticipated
asymmetric domestic monetary policy shock. Initially, the domestic interest
rate increases, then the Taylor rule kicks in and the interest rate slowly
20For discussion see for example Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2003).
reverts to the steady state.
In response to a higher nominal interest rate, we observe a decline in
inﬂation, consumption and investment. Although real wage also decreases,
we observe an increase of employment, since income eﬀect dominates the
substitution eﬀect. In spite of the latter, GDP falls, due to the decline of
capital. After the initial decline of debt, households start to borrow from
abroad to smooth out consumption. In reaction to an increase in the interest
rates diﬀerential, the exchange rate appreciates (i.e. drops) in real terms.
When we compare the reaction of the model to the technology shock
(see Figure 2) and the monetary policy shock (see Figure 3), we can observe
that the economy stabilizes much faster in the latter case. This feature is
relatively intuitive - the technology shock is an example of a supply shock,
generating more persistent response of the economy. On the other hand -
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4 Results
In this section we analyse the business cycle behaviour of the most important
macroeconomic variables of the Polish economy in the presence of shocks in
two regimes:
• Autonomous Monetary Policy (denoted as OUT), monetary policy in
Poland is conducted by the National Bank of Poland and the Taylor
rule describing this policy is given by equation (47), while monetary
policy in the Eurozone is conducted by the ECB and the Taylor rule
that describes this policy is given by equation (48). The nominal
exchange rate is not ﬁxed and adjusts freely to the market conditions.
• Common Monetary Policy (denoted as IN), monetary policy both in
Poland and the Eurozone is conducted by the ECB according to the
Taylor rule that is the same as the ECB Taylor rule estimated from
the data, except for it assigns the weight ωT =
˜ Y PL




t =0 .76 ˆ R
∗
t−1 +( 1− 0.76)[1.5(ωTˆ π
asas




ˆ ˜ Yt +( 1− ωT)ˆ ˜ Y
∗
t )+0 .1(ωT
ˆ d˜ Yt +( 1− ωT) ˆ d˜ Y
∗
t )+





The nominal exchange rate is ﬁxed and cannot be changed et =¯ e.
We want to stress that in this simulation we do not eliminate the risk
premium volatility as a source of the interest rate diﬀerential between
domestic and foreign households. In our model the risk is associated
with ﬂuctuations of the domestic debt rather than ﬂuctuations of the
exchange rate. Thus the accession to the Eurozone does not eliminate
the eﬀect that this risk has on the interest rate diﬀerential.
Given the diﬀerences between the two regimes there are four important fac-
tors that may aﬀect the Polish economy after joining the Eurozone: (1)
the Taylor rule that is more inﬂation oriented; 2) less variability hitting
the Polish economy, since the Polish monetary policy shock is replaced with
the Eurozone monetary policy shock (which standard deviation is 3 times
smaller); (3) the monetary policy rule focused on the whole Eurozone econ-
omy rather than the Polish economy; and (4) ﬁxed nominal exchange rate.
To analyse the diﬀerences between the two regimes we run 50,000 sim-
ulations for 1000 periods each. Using the results from the simulations we
compare the business cycle behaviour of the most important macroeconomic
variables and we compute the change of the consumer’s welfare in Poland
after the Eurozone accession.4
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4.1 GDP and Inﬂation Variability
In our simulations we calculated standard deviations of the main macroe-
conomic variables. The results are presented in Table 4. Most variables
are more volatile under the Common Monetary Policy, which is mostly due
to the fact it ﬁts the Polish economy less than the Autonomous Monetary
Policy. The increase in volatility would be even bigger if it was not is of this
factors out-weights the impact of the replacement of the domestic monetary
policy shock with the Eurozone monetary policy shock (which is ﬁve times
less volatile). The only exception is inﬂation, which is less volatile under the
Common Monetary Policy than the Autonomous Monetary Policy. In this
case there are three factors that decrease the volatility of inﬂation. First, the
Taylor rule under the Common Monetary Policy is more inﬂation oriented
than the Taylor rule under the Autonomous Monetary Policy. Second, the
domestic monetary policy shock under the Autonomous Monetary Policy
regime is more volatile than the foreign monetary policy shock under the
Common Monetary Policy, thus adds more volatility to the economy and
it mostly aﬀects inﬂation. Third, ﬁxing the nominal exchange rate stabi-
lizes inﬂation in the home country. This result is somewhat diﬀerent than
Karam, Laxton, Rose, and Tamirisa (2008), who ﬁnd that the volatility of
both GDP and inﬂation increases after a new member country joins the
Eurozone, whereas we ﬁnd that volatility of GDP increases but inﬂation
becomes more stable.






GDP 0.0262 0.0272 +4%
Inﬂation 0.0242 0.0096 -60%
Interest Rate 0.0211 0.0294 +39%
Consumption 0.0133 0.0225 +69%
Labor 0.0130 0.0142 +9%
One might also wonder why the interest rate after the Euro adoption is
more volatile. This is mostly due to the ﬁxing of the nominal exchange rate.
Note, that in the Common Monetary Policy regime, the diﬀerential of the
interest rates (the UIP condition, see equation (A.13)) depends on the risk
premium, the expected change in the real exchange rate and the diﬀerence
in the expected inﬂation. But, in the Common Monetary Policy regime the
UIP condition is replaced with the following condition (in the log-linearised
version)
ˆ Rt − ˆ R
∗
t =ˆ κt. (50)32
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Thus, the shocks to the risk premium aﬀect only the interest rate diﬀerential,
whereas with ﬂoating exchange rates some of the impact is cushioned by the
exchange rate (which absorbs some of the volatility). Also greater volatility
of the interest rate increases the volatility of consumption, which explains
why the volatility of consumption increases by more than the volatility of
GDP.
4.2 Welfare Cost
The results presented in the previous subsection do not provide quantitative
measure of the cost of losing autonomous monetary policy associated with
joining the Eurozone. Thus, we expressed the cost in terms of the consumer
welfare. We ask how much consumption households would be willing to give
up in order to stay indiﬀerent between joining and not joining the Eurozone.
This corresponds to calculating the compensating variation associated with
the full elimination of the Autonomous Monetary Policy regime. Welfare
analysis follows the method of Lucas (1987).


































Next we compute what percentage (denoted by λ)o fe v ery period consump-
tion, consumers would have to give up to be indiﬀerent between the regimes.






t=0 βtu((1 − λ)ct,l t,ζ t)]. The details on how λ is com-
puted are presented in Appendix B. We ﬁnd that λ =0 .068%. This means
that losing autonomous monetary policy associated with joining the Euro-
zone would have the same eﬀect as a decrease in consumption by 0.068%
in every period. Note, that it does not mean that the authors expect con-
sumption in Poland to decrease permanently by 0.068% after the Eurozone
accession.
This result is a little bit smaller that the 0.25% estimate of Lopes (2007),
but her result might be biased since, as far as we understand, she run only
one simulation in each regime (one realization of random shocks). It seems
that in order to deal with this problem she extended the simulation for many
periods (1000), but we are not entirely convinced that extending the length
of the simulation solves the problem of the bias. So, instead, we run 50000
simulations, as we noticed that in our case only a large number of simulations
guaranties convergence of the welfare result.4
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We can also express this welfare cost in period zero consumption rather
than permanent consumption. Ino r der to do thisw ecomputew hat per-
centage (denoted as λ0)o fp eriod zero consumption households would have




where W(λ0)=E0 [u((1 − λ0)c0,l 0,ζ 0)+
∞
t=1 βtu(ct,l t,ζ t)]. We ﬁnd that
λ0 =6 .17%. This means that losing autonomous monetary policy associated
with joining the Eurozone would have the same eﬀect as a 6.17% (one time)
decrease in period zero consumption. Again, note that it does not mean that
the authors expect consumption in Poland to fall by 6.17% in the period after
the Eurozone accession.
To get a grasp on the results note, that welfare is computed using the
utility function in (3), thus it depends on consumption and labor. Hence, we
need to analyse behaviour of consumption and labor in both regimes. Note
from Table 4, that the volatility of both consumption and labor is higher
in the Common Monetary Policy regime than in the Autonomous Mone-
tary Policy regime. So given our utility function it clearly must translate
into lower welfare in the Common Monetary Policy regime than in the Au-
tonomous Monetary Policy regime. We also computed the welfare cost of the
business cycle (in terms of the deterministic steady state consumption). We
found that the welfare cost of business cycle in the Autonomous Monetary
Policy regime is equal to 0.029%, whereas in the Common Monetary Policy
regime is equal to 0.097%. These results are just a little bit higher than the
estimates of Lucas (1987) for the US economy, who calculates the cost of the
business cycle at 0.01%, but the US economy is more stable. Furthermore,
Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001) use OLG framework to point out
that the welfare cost of business cycle might be sensitive to the persistence
of the variables. We do not use the OLG framework, nevertheless, in our
model the persistence of both consumption and labor is roughly in line with
the data.
We want to stress that in our model wages are not sticky, which trans-
lates into lower welfare cost of business cycles. Including the sticky wages
in our model could increase the welfare cost of the Eurozone accession. Un-
fortunately, our way of simulating the welfare eﬀect of joining the Eurozone
precludes adding the wage stickiness to the model. This would be an inter-
esting extension of our work. Another extension worth considering might be
the extension is going beyond the representative agent framework, which has
ap otential for generating higher costs of business cycles. The heterogene-
ity alone might not be enough though, since the results of Schulhofer-Wohl
(2008) show that adding the risk aversion heterogeneity among consumers
with complete markets (full insurance against risk) actually decreases the
costs of business cycle ﬂuctuations. On the other hand, after the accession
to the Eurozone, the volatilities of shocks hitting the Polish economy may34
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fall and their correlations with the Eurozone counterparts may increase21.
The inclusion of these possible changes into our simulations should result in
lower estimates of costs of losing autonomous monetary policy.
4.3 Decomposition of Volatility Changes
In this subsection we decompose the change in volatility of the main macroe-
conomic variables into separate factors related to the Eurozone accession
presented on page 30. We stress that the simulations run here are used only
for the purpose of isolating the eﬀects of diﬀerent factors that are involved in
joining the Eurozone. In order to achieve the desired isolation, while making
those simulations, we make counter-factual assumptions.
First, as the starting point for the decomposition of the variance we use
the results from the simulation Out. These results are presented in Table 6
in the column denoted as “Simulation 1”.
Second, we compute the eﬀect of the change of the Taylor rule param-
eters. The Eurozone Taylor rule diﬀers from the Polish Taylor rule in two
important ways: (1) it is more inﬂation oriented; and (2) the extend of the
of the interest rate smoothing is higher. To isolate this eﬀect we run the
following simulation. We keep everything exactly the same as in the ﬁrst
simulation, but the parameters of the NBP Taylor rule. We replace the
parameters of the NBP Taylor rule with the parameters from the ECB Tay-
lor rule. This experiment allows us to say how the standard deviations of
the main macroeconomic variables would change if the NBP ran autonomous
monetary policy (responding to the Polish variables only), but with the same
parameters as the ECB. The results of this simulation are presented in Table
6i nt he column denoted as “Simulation 2”. To see the eﬀect of this change
compare the results from the ﬁrst and second simulations. This change leads
to lower variability of inﬂation and greater variability of GDP. This is not
surprising given that the Taylor rule changes from more GDP oriented to
more inﬂation oriented. Greater variability of GDP translates into greater
variability of the real side of the economy, i.e. the standard deviations of
consumption and labor increase. Also, greater interest rate smoothing com-
bined with more inﬂation oriented monetary policy and smaller variability
of inﬂation reduces the standard deviation of the interest rate.
Table 5: The decomposition of the volatility changes.
Variables Simulation 1 Simulation 2 Simulation 3 Simulation 4
GDP 0.0262 0.0317 0.0286 0.0272
Inﬂation 0.0242 0.0152 0.0129 0.0096
Interest rate 0.0211 0.0126 0.0106 0.0294
Consumption 0.0133 0.0158 0.0138 0.0225
Labor 0.0130 0.0133 0.0132 0.0142
21In the study we assumed no correlation between shocks in the Eurozone and Poland.4
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Third, we analyse the eﬀect of the replacement of the domestic monetary
policy shock with the foreign monetary policy shock. Thus, we make only
modiﬁcation comparing to the second simulation. We replace the value of
the variance of the monetary policy shock (estimated for the Polish econ-
omy) with the corresponding value from the Eurozone. The purpose of this
exercise is to isolate the eﬀect of smaller volatility of the monetary policy
shock in the Eurozone than in Poland. The results of this simulation are
presented in Table 6 in the column denoted as “Simulation 3”. This change
reduces the volatility of the economy, which is pretty intuitive, since the
standard deviation of the monetary policy shock declines from 0.01 to 0.002.
Finally, we isolate the eﬀects of ﬁxing of the exchange rate combined with
the adoption of the common monetary policy rule - as shown in equation
(49)22. Fixing of the exchange rate has two eﬀects for the economy: on
the one hand it means losing an instrument that can cushion some external
shocks to the economy (for example the shock to foreign demand for domestic
output) but on the other hand the exchange rate risk aﬀects negatively both
exporters and importers. Therefore, depending on the strength of these two
eﬀects ﬁxing the exchange rate may reduce or increase the volatility of the
economy. While the eﬀect of the ﬁxing of the exchange rate is uncertain
the eﬀect of the adoption of the common monetary policy rule is clear.
Since the common monetary policy rule reacts to the extended Eurozone
variables rather than the Polish ones, it is less ﬁt to stabilize the Polish
economy. Thus, the adoption of the common monetary policy rule increases
the volatility of the Polish economy23. Summing up, using theory we cannot
determine the direction of the changes created by these eﬀects and we have
to rely on numerical simulations. The results of this simulation are presented
in Table 6 in the column denoted as “Simulation 4”. In fact this is the ﬁnal
change, thus this simulation is exactly the same as the simulation IN in the
previous subsection. These results show that the volatility of GDP decreases
and some of its components become more stable and some less stable. In
particular the volatility of consumption, investment, and imports goes up by,
respectively, 63%, 21%, and 113% and the volatility of exports goes down by
53% (as the volatility of the real exchange rate declines by 72%). Also, the
volatility of inﬂation decreases. On the other hand, the results show that
the exchange rate absorbs some of the volatility of the interest rate, thus
ﬁxing it leads to an increase of the volatility of the interest rate diﬀerential
(due to risk premium), which in turn translates into higher volatility of the
domestic interest rate. Moreover, since the volatility of consumption and
labor is higher, the relative impact of higher volatility the interest rate on
consumption and labor is stronger than the impact of smaller volatility of
22Due to technical reasons - violation of the Blanchard-Khan conditions - we were not
able to separate these two eﬀects.
23This claim is also supported by the result of the next section were we show how the
change of weight of the Polish economy in the common monetary policy rule changes the
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4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this subsection we analyse the eﬀect of an increase of the weight of Pol-
ish variables in the extended Eurozone Taylor rule from the GDP share -
ωT =2 .97% - to the population share - ω
 
T =1 0 .76%. The results of the new
simulation are presented in Table 6. Basically the results are pretty much the
same as previously. Furthermore, the welfare cost of joining the Eurozone
drops only slightly from λ =0 .068% to λ
  =0 .066% of the lifetime con-
sumption, or diﬀerently from λ0 =6 .17% to λ
 
0 =5 .99% of the period zero
consumption. This only slightly lessens the macroeconomic consequences of
losing autonomous monetary policy after the Eurozone accession.











T =1 0 .76%)
GDP 0.0276 0.0327 0.0325
Inﬂation 0.0288 0.0098 0.0097
Interest Rate 0.0261 0.0300 0.0299
Consumption 0.0106 0.0208 0.0206
Labor 0.0119 0.0134 0.013355
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5 Conclusion
The Eurozone accession for Poland might be costly, since it means losing
monetary policy as a tool to smooth out the business cycles. We build a
two country dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to quantify the
eﬀect of the loss of the autonomous monetary policy. In our model there are
nominal rigidities in the form of sticky prices, which makes monetary policy
not neutral in the short run. There are numerous eﬀects associated with the
Eurozone accession. This study focuses on the eﬀects of losing autonomous
monetary policy on the business cycle behaviour of the main macroeconomic
variables and welfare. It is not a complete study of all the cost and beneﬁts
of the Euro adoption.
Since the evidence that higher ﬂuctuations cause lower economic growth
is scarce, we assumed that changes in the business cycle behaviour will not
have any long run eﬀect on the Polish economy. We focused on the change
in the business cycle behaviour of the main macroeconomic variables. We
found that after Poland joins the Eurozone, the volatility of GDP increases
- the standard deviation of GDP goes up from 2.62% to 2.72%, and the
volatility of inﬂation decreases - the standard deviation of inﬂation goes
down from 2.41% to 0.96%. We additionally present how diﬀerent factors
involved with the Eurozone accession aﬀect these outcomes.
We also calculated the impact of this change on the consumers welfare
and we found that the regime change has the same eﬀect as the decline
of consumption in the period after the Eurozone accession by 6.17% (or a
decline of lifetime consumption by 0.068%). Moreover, we checked how the
weight of the Polish economy in the decisions of the ECB aﬀects the results
and we found that the increase in weight from 2.93% (which is equal to the
GDP share) to 10.76% (which is equal to the population share) lessens the
cost of joining the Eurozone, but the diﬀerence is tiny.
Furthermore, our analysis suggest that it is not enough to look at GDP
and inﬂation to judge the impact of the autonomous monetary policy loss on
the economy, because the changes in business cycle behaviour of consump-
tion, labor and the interest rate might be greater and more important, from
the welfare perspective.
We want to stress that in our model wages are ﬂexible, which, most
likely, means that our result underestimates the cost of joining the Euro-
zone. Another restriction that might aﬀect the results is the existence of the
representative agent - relaxing this restriction could increase the cost of busi-
ness cycle ﬂuctuations and might aﬀect the costs of the Eurozone accession.
Additionally, the introduction of unemployment into the concept of equi-
librium (like e.g. in the search-matching framework) might also positively
aﬀect the costs of business ﬂuctuations. On the other hand, the costs may
be lower, if the accession to the Eurozone increases correlations of shocks or
decreases their volatilities. We leave these extensions for future research.38
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Appendix
A The Log-linearised Model
Denote the log deviation of a variable from its deterministic steady state as





.T oderive the ﬁrst order approximation we use the following
method
xt =¯ xxt¯ x
−1 =¯ xe
(logxt−log ¯ x) =¯ xe
log
xt
¯ x =¯ xe
ˆ xt ≈ ¯ x(1 + ˆ xt)
A.1 Households
Capital accumulation. From (6) we obtain










Capital supply. From (7) we obtain





t + ˆ ˜ k
∗
t. (A.4)



























Euler equation. From (12) we obtain
σEt (ˆ ct+1 − ˆ ct)= Et


ˆ rt+1 − ˆ Qt − β(1 − δ)































Capital utilization. From (13) we obtain
ˆ rt =
Ψ   (1)





Ψ   (1)
∗




No arbitrage, capital and nominal assets. From (14) we obtain
σEt (ˆ ct+1 − ˆ ct)= Et
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No arbitrage, home and international assets. From (15) we obtain




(ˆ qt+1 − ˆ qt)+






Risk premium. From (4) we obtain




ˆ dt − ˆ ˜ Yt

+  κ,t. (A.14)
Labor market. From (9) and (10) we obtain















Pt , pF,t =
PF,t













Demand for homogeneous intermediate goods. From (19) and (20)
we obtain
ˆ YH,t = −
1+µ
µ
ˆ pH,t + ˆ Yt, (A.17)
ˆ YF,t = −
1+µ
µ
















F,t + ˆ Y
∗
t . (A.20)
The inﬂation of intermediate goods prices. From the deﬁnition of
relative prices and inﬂation we obtain.
ˆ πH,t =ˆ πt +ˆ pH,t − ˆ pH,t−1, (A.21)
















H,t − ˆ p
∗
H,t−1. (A.24)
Final goods producers. From (21) we obtain
ˆ πt =(1− η)(¯ pF)
−1
µ (ˆ πF,t +ˆ pF,t−1)+η (¯ pH)
−1




























Marginal costs of heterogeneous intermediate goods. From (31) we
obtain






t +( 1− α
∗)(ˆ w
∗
t − ˆ z
∗
t). (A.28)Annexes
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Optimal production factors employment. From (32) we obtain
ˆ rt − ˆ wt =ˆ lt − ˆ kt, (A.29)
ˆ r
∗




t − ˆ k
∗
t. (A.30)
Prices of heterogeneous intermediate goods. From (35) and (36) we
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(ˆ mct − qt), (A.32)





































1+β∗(θF)2 (ˆ pF,t−1 − ˆ πt)+
β∗θF
1+β∗(θF)2Et (ˆ pF,t+1 +ˆ πt+1)
+
(1 − θF)(1− β∗θF)
1+β∗(θF)2 (ˆ mc
∗
t +ˆ qt). (A.34)
Aggregate Production function. From (28) and (22) we obtain
αˆ kt +( 1− α)
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Government expenditures. From (38) we obtain
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A.4 Central Bank
Taylor rule. From (39) we obtain
ˆ Rt = γR ˆ Rt−1 +( 1− γR)

γπˆ πt + γy
ˆ ˜ Yt + γdy




































A.5 Closing the Model
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GDP. From (46) we obtain
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¯ q¯ ˜ Y ∗
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(ˆ pF + ˆ YF − ˆ qt)−
−
¯ p∗
H ¯ Y ∗
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¯ ˜ Y ∗
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∗
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∗
H). (A.45)Annexes
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BW elfare Cost Computation
Here we describe the details of computing λ.F irst notice that it is much




¯ c1−σ , (B.1)
rather than (53). Next we split total utility into utility from consumption




































It is convenient to denote W C,Θ ≡ W C,Θ(1), than
WC,Θ(λ)
¯ c1−σ =( 1−λ)1−σ WC,Θ
¯ c1−σ .
To ﬁnd WC,Θ
¯ c1−σ and WL,Θ
¯ c1−σ ﬁrst notice that (9) and (10) imply that in the
deterministic steady state
 ¯ c
1−σ = ψ¯ l
1+γ. (B.5)
After straightforward computations of the equilibrium conditions in the de-
terministic steady state we get that
  =










which we calibrated to match the deterministic steady state relationships





















Notice that with this formula it is not necessary to ﬁnd the deterministic
steady state values of ¯ c or ¯ l.
To ﬁnd the welfare cost expressed in period zero consumption λ0 we use




¯ c1−σ , (B.9)46
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where
W Θ(λ0)




















=( 1 − λ0)(1 − β)
W C,Θ




¯ c1−σ . (B.11)